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Risk Sharing and Commuting Among US Federal States
*
 
Financial markets provide imperfect insurance of labor income risk. However, workers can 
partly insure against labor market risk by commuting to adjacent regions. Since commuters 
own wage claims to output produced in adjacent regions, the business cycle in the 
neighborhood becomes a relevant risk factor at the regional level. In our empirical analysis 
for US states, we show this effect to be important. State-specific consumption comoves with 
business cycle shocks that hit adjacent states, in particular if a state is integrated by 
commuter flows. This labor market perspective on regional risk sharing complements 
previous studies that investigated risk sharing through financial markets. 
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One key prediction of the neoclassical business cycle model is that idiosyncratic output
ﬂuctuations should not fully transmit into income or consumption ﬂuctuations. In fact, if
there exists a full set of insurance markets, one for each commodity contingent on each state
of the world, households can fully insulate their consumption from idiosyncratic output
shocks. This empirical prediction of the neoclassical model under complete markets has
been tested using microeconomic data, see e.g. Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), or Townsend
(1994). Aggregate data has been used to examine the international and interregional
versions of the "risk sharing" prediction.1
A general insight of both approaches is that observed levels of risk sharing fall short of
the theoretical prediction under complete markets. This fact may reﬂect that the model of
an economy with a complete set of insurance markets is an abstract idealization. Indeed,
the major source of uncertainty originates in human capital and human capital is an asset
for which private ﬁnancial insurance opportunities are almost non-existent, see Drèze and
Gollier (1993). Hedging human capital risk would involve a substantial short position
in those assets which can be traded on ﬁnancial markets as Baxter and Jermann (1997)
show. It is therefore an important question, whether there are partial substitutes for
missing ﬁnancial insurance markets covering human capital.
Even if ﬁnancial insurance opportunities are non-existent, one option for a household to
smooth labor income is to rent out his human capital physically into other regions. Plainly
speaking, this option is to change ones place of work in response to regional business cycles.
In principle, extensive interregional migration, responding to the slightest output shock,
would quickly even out small changes in per capita GDP. However, migration is costly.
Agents may therefore try to smooth income and consumption by deciding to commute,
which is considerably cheaper than migration.
Commuters hold wage claims to output produced outside their place of residence. This
separation facilitates risk sharing. For instance, if household members are working in
diﬀerent geographical labor markets, household-level labor market risk is diversiﬁed to
some extent. An alternative example is that workers commute to adjacent labor markets
in response to business cycle shocks that hit their home region. In a nutshell, commuting
provides regional risk sharing, because regional output and consumption growth become
1See e.g. Obstfeld (1994), Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996), Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Kalemli-
Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003), and Becker and Hoﬀmann (2006). In line with this macroeconomic
literature, we will use the terms "risk sharing" and "smoothing" interchangeably, meaning any economic
activity to disentangle consumption and output, like ex-ante portfolio diversiﬁcation ("capital market risk
sharing") and ex-post adjustment of savings behavior ("credit market risk sharing"), see e.g. Asdrubali,
Sørensen, and Yosha (1996).
2separated through commuter’s income.2
Our contribution to the existing literature on regional risk sharing through ﬁnancial
markets is to add a labor market perspective. We run similar regressions that have been
used to measure risk sharing through ﬁnancial markets (see e.g. Asdrubali, Sørensen,
and Yosha, 1996), but additionally take into account the eﬀects of commuting on the
covariation between regional output and consumption. By deﬁnition, commuters do not
work in the region they reside in, which means that commuters own wage claims to the
output produced elsewhere. Therefore, their income and consumption are related to the
business cycle in the neighborhood rather than to the business cycle at their place of
residence. At the regional level, this spatial dependency implies that the business cycle at
home is not the only idiosyncratic risk factor a region is exposed to. In the presence of
commuting, the business cycle in the neighborhood becomes an additional risk factor that
drives region-speciﬁc consumption.
These considerations, which we elaborate more on in Section 2, motivate us to consider
am o d i ﬁcation of Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha’s (1996) approach to measure risk sharing
among regions. In our empirical speciﬁcation, we allow state-speciﬁc consumption to vary
with two rather than one risk factors. In our analysis for US federal states it turns out
that the business cycle in the neighborhood is an important risk factor for consumption
that has been overlooked in previous studies. We are also able to provide evidence that
commuter ﬂows correlate with this spatial comovement.
The paper is organized as follows. To ﬁx ideas we provide a brief discussion of the
relation between regional risk sharing and commuting in Section 2. In this section we
formulate empirical hypotheses which are tested in the remainder of the paper. The
data is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 motivates our analysis by illustrating that
standard risk sharing regressions yield diﬀerent estimation results at diﬀerent levels of
regional aggregation. This pattern is consistent with the fact that these regressions neglect
commuting linkages. In Section 5, we augment the empirical model by allowing state-
speciﬁc consumption to vary with the business cycle in the neighborhood. We examine
this spatial comovement in terms of commuting linkages in Section 6. The last section
concludes the paper.
2The only paper we are aware of which addresses the issue of regional risk sharing and commuting is
Borge and Matsen (2004). In their risk sharing study for Norway, Borge and Matsen (2004) attempt to
control for the eﬀects of commuting by using data at diﬀerent levels of regional aggregation. We provide
a similar experiment in Section 4. However, Borge and Matsen (2004) do not introduce explicit data on
c o m m u t i n gl i n k a g e sa sw ed o .
32 Theoretical considerations
One way to measure regional income risk sharing is a regression of region-speciﬁc( i d i o -
syncratic) income growth rates on region-speciﬁc output changes, see e.g. Demyanyk,
Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007). Under full income risk sharing, idiosyncratic income
does not comove with idiosyncratic output shocks. Ultimately, however, agents care about
a smooth stream of intertemporal consumption. The overall amount of consumption risk
sharing that is achieved after all levels of smoothing is revealed by a regression of idio-
syncratic consumption growth rates on idiosyncratic output ﬂuctuations. If output risk is
fully diversiﬁed, consumption moves one-to-one with aggregate consumption, whilst being
independent of idiosyncratic risk factors, such as region-speciﬁc output shocks.
These empirical implications are derived from models that highlight the role of ﬁnancial
claims to income derived from various forms of capital. However, ﬁnancial markets provide
little hedging of wage income, since human capital is nontradable. In consequence, a
household may be induced to smooth shocks to the productivity of his home region by
deciding to rent out his human capital physically into other regions. Changing ones place
of work by commuting to an adjacent region is one important way of doing so.
To illustrate the relation between risk sharing measured at the regional level and com-
muting, we consider two regions, region i and an adjacent region j. Productivity across
regions is imperfectly correlated. We ﬁrst consider an extreme scenario in which there are
no ﬁnancial markets and there is no mobility of labor. In this scenario, there is no regional
risk sharing at all and we will, therefore, observe a perfect comovement of region i’s income,
consumption, and output (the same holds for region j). Now we assume that some workers
living in region j decide to work in region i. Thus region i experiences in-commuting from
region j.
How does in-commuting aﬀect the covariation between idiosyncratic output, income,
and consumption in region i?3 Region i’s output movements no longer translate fully into
changes in region i’s income and consumption, because workers, who commute from the
adjacent region j to region i, bear a part of region i’s output risk. Eﬀectively, commuters
export a part of region i’s output risk to their place of residence in region j by owning
wage claims to region i’s risky output. At the same time, however, commuting also goes
into the other direction, i.e. some workers living in region i will own wage claims to
region j’s output. Before discussing these eﬀects in more detail, we can formulate a ﬁrst,
general, hypothesis, which refers to the simple fact that commuting is a more important
phenomenon the smaller we deﬁne regions. In turn, this implies that ignoring commuting in
3It should be emphasized that this study investigates the relation between risk sharing and commuting
measured at the level of regions, not at the individual or household level.
4the empirical analysis altogether should have diﬀerent eﬀects at diﬀerent levels of regional
aggregation.
Hypothesis 1 Standard risk sharing regressions yield diﬀerent estimation results at
diﬀerent levels of regional aggregation, since commuting is more important the smaller the
regional entities are.
As a motivating experiment, we provide a test of Hypothesis 1 by estimating risk
sharing regressions for 48 US federal states as well as for 8 BEA Regions.4 Using explicit
data on commuting, we can provide a more direct test of the eﬀects we are after. If region
i experiences in-commuting from the adjacent region j, ap a r to fr e g i o ni’s output risk
is exported to the neighborhood by commuters holding wage claims to region i’s risky
output. From the perspective of region i, this eﬀect can be summarized as follows.
Hypothesis 2 Commuting helps to smooth state-speciﬁc income and consumption,
because state-speciﬁc income and output growth become separated through commuters’
income.
Of course, commuting goes into both directions, which means that some workers living
in region i will decide to work in the adjacent region j. These workers receive and spend
their labor incomes at their place of residence in region i, while they contribute to the
output produced in region j. Eﬀectively, commuters import the business cycle risk of the
adjacent region to the region in which they reside. From the perspective of region i, this
implies that aggregate income and consumption will vary with the business cycle in region
j.
In reality, there are more than two regions and workers cannot commute to every
region likewise. This fact implies that human capital risk and with it income ﬂows derived
from labor cannot be diversiﬁed all over the country as perfect risk sharing would suggest.
Rather, labor income ﬂows between regions will be "biased" towards the neighborhood,
in a sense that workers hold a disproportionately high fraction of claims to the output
produced in adjacent regions. Consequently, region-speciﬁc aggregate variables will comove
with output changes in neighboring regions. We will seek empirical evidence for this eﬀect,
which is summarized by the following hypothesis.5
Hypothesis 3 State-speciﬁc income and consumption comove with output ﬂuctua-
tions in adjacent states, as commuters own wage claims to the output produced in the
4Since there is neither data on production nor on consumption at the county level, we cannot analyze
risk sharing at ﬁner levels of regional aggregation.
5Note that we are not refering to a spatial correlation in output across regions, which could be due to
production externalities or various forms of linkages other than risk sharing. Hypothesis 3 refers to the
relation between neighbor-speciﬁc output changes and state-speciﬁc income and consumption changes (not
between neighbor-speciﬁc output and state-speciﬁc output).
5neighborhood.
How do our hypotheses relate to the standard approach to measure regional risk shar-
ing? The standard approach is solely concerned with the covariation between region-
speciﬁc aggregates, i.e. only state-speciﬁc output shocks are assumed to drive income and
consumption. Typically, the wedges between regional aggregate variables (such as output,
income, and consumption) are attributed to ﬁnancial markets (and ﬁscal redistribution).
Our previous discussion suggests that these wedges actually reﬂect combined eﬀects of
ﬁnancial markets and commuting linkages. Moreover, standard risk sharing regressions
neglect one potentially relevant risk factor–the business cycle in the neighborhood.
3 Data and notation
The state-level data used in the analysis is the data constructed by Asdrubali, Sørensen,
and Yosha (1996), but for an extended period of time. We employ annual data on Gross
State Product (GSP), state-level personal income, and state consumption during the period
1970-1998.6 All data is deﬂated by the common consumer price deﬂator. Since we prefer
a consistent concept of neighbors in our spatial analysis, we exclude Hawai, Alaska, and
D.C. and focus on the 48 continental federal states.
Data on GSP is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). GSP is deﬁned
as the value added of the industries of a state and is thus measured at the place of work.
By contrast, state-level personal income is measured at the place of residence and consists
of the sum of earnings (wages and proprietors‘ income) and distributed proﬁts (including
interest and rent) of residents of the state.
Since data on actual private consumption at the state level is not available, Asdrubali,
Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) use per capita annual retail sales, by state, as a proxy for
per capita private state consumption. Retail sales are then rescaled by the ratio of total
private consumption to total US retail sales.
Consumption per capita in federal state k in period t is denoted by Ck
t and the US-
wide per capita consumption is C∗
t . Lower-case letters denote logarithms, so that ∆ck
t is




Throughout the paper we will work with idiosyncratic (state-speciﬁc) growth rates,
6While this data is available for the period 1963-1998, data on interstate commuter ﬂows is not available
before 1970. We therefore have to restrict the analysis to the period 1970-1998.













Removing US-wide aggregate growth rates is crucial for the analysis of risk sharing, because
aggregate shocks cannot be diversiﬁed.
I nt h ee s t i m a t i o n s ,w eq u a n t i f yb yh o wm u c hs t a t e - s p e c i ﬁc income and consumption
growth vary with state-speciﬁc output shocks. Moreover, we examine whether the business
cycle in adjacent states is a driving force for state-speciﬁc consumption. To quantify this
spatial comovement, we need to measure, for each state, the average output ﬂuctuation in
the neighborhood.
Output per capita in the neighborhood of state k in period t is denoted by Zk
t . This













where Nk comprises all neighbors to state k, W is a 48×48 binary contiguity matrix, and
outt and popt are stacked vectors of output and population, respectively.
The symmetric matrix W contains the binary contiguity relationships among states.
This means that in the matrix W values of unity are placed in positions i,j,w h e r ej
indicates states that have borders touching state i. Thus W has entries of zeros for non-
neighbors and ones for neighbors, with zeros on the main diagonal. Pre-multipyling the
stacked vectors of output and population by matrix W yields Zk
t .
We experimented with several procedures to construct W and it turned out that our
results are not very sensitive to the particular choice for W.7 To illustrate the sparsity
of W, Table 1 displays some summary statistics for the number of neighbors according
to our choice for W. States in the center of the US, such as Missouri or Tennesse, have
up to eight neighbors, while other states, such as Washington or Florida, have only two
7The entries of W can be determined on the basis of polygon centroid coordinates using a procedure
called Voronoi tesselation, see Anselin (1988). An alternative procedure is to ﬁnd a given number of nearest
neighbors to each state. A third possibility is to use a map and to construct W by hand. The estimations
reported in the paper are obtained using a neighborhood matrix W that was generated using polygon
centroid coordinates. We found it prudent to compare this matrix to a map and we veriﬁed that the
neighboring relations are indeed reasonable.
7Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of neighbors in W 4.46 1.60 1 8
In-commuter rate INk
1970 .0236 .0210 .0006 .0970
Out-commuter rate OUTk
1970 .0256 .0295 .0005 .1320
In-commuter rate INk
1980 .0282 .0221 .0023 .1055
Out-commuter rate OUTk
1980 .0292 .0278 .0027 .1356
In-commuter rate INk
1990 .0317 .0261 .0021 .1293
Out-commuter rate OUTk
1990 .0343 .0345 .0020 .1757
In-commuter rate INk
2000 .0357 .0289 .0026 .1509
Out-commuter rate OUTk
2000 .0389 .0364 .0028 .1634
Notes:M a t r i xW contains the binary contiguity relationships among states. Thus W has
entries of zeros for non-neighbors and ones for neighbors, with zeros on the main diagonal.
The baseline data for commuter rates is the total number of workers commuting between
counties of residence and counties of work in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. This data is
derived from the Census Bureau decennial censuses (US Census Bureau, Population
Division, Journey-To-Work and Migration Statistics Branch). The Census Bureau
estimates commuting patterns from two questions: "Where do you live?" and "Where did
you work last week?". Given this information, the Census estimates the number of
persons working in a county by county where they reside and the number of persons
living in a county by county where they work. We have aggregated the bilateral
county-level commuter ﬂows to the state level. Only commuting among the 48
continental federal states has been considered. The variable INk
t denotes commuting
from other states to state k, relative to state k’s employment. The variable OUTk
t
denotes the out-commuter rate for state k.
8neighbors. The average state has between 4 and 5 neighbors.
With Zk






State- and neighbor-speciﬁc output shocks are positively correlated, but the correlation
coeﬃcient between ∆˜ xk
t and ∆˜ zk
t is with 0.544 not too high. Since our data set is fairly
large, we can thus separate the impact of both risk factors in our estimations.
The key question of our analysis is whether risk sharing depends on the extent of
commuting linkages between states. Unfortunately, consecutive time-series data on com-
muter ﬂows between US states is not available. The only data that is available are special
tabulations from the decennial Censuses of 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, which show bi-
lateral commuter ﬂows between counties, i.e. the total number of workers commuting
between counties of residence and counties of work.8 We aggregate the county data to
the federal-state level and calculate commuter ﬂows into and out of each state. In the
aggregation, we only consider commuting among the 48 continental states, i.e. we ex-
clude commuters from and to foreign countries and workers at sea. Commuter ﬂows are
then normalized by state-level employment in order to determine commuter rates. We
denote the in-commuter rate for federal state k at time t by INk
t , and OUTk
t denotes the
out-commuter rate (t = 1970,1980,1990,2000).
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for commuter rates. It can be seen that commuting
has become more important over time. In 2000, the mean values of commuter rates indicate
that more than 3.5% of workers do not reside in the state they work in.
4 Risk sharing among states and BEA regions









U + βU∆˜ xk
t + εk
U,t. (3)
Regression (2) measures interstate income risk sharing. Risk is shared if state-level
income reacts less than one-to-one to idiosyncratic shocks to output (βK < 1).W er e f e r
to (1 − βK) · 100% as the percentage of risk shared at the income smoothing level. Long-
lasting diﬀerences in growth performances across states are controlled for by including state
ﬁxed-eﬀects, µk
K and µk
U. In regression (3), (1 − βU)·100% measures the overall amount of
8See http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/journey.html. The data can be down-
loaded from http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/reis/jtw/default.cfm.
9consumption risk sharing that is achieved after all levels of smoothing. Regressions like (2)
and (3) are often interpreted to measure the amounts of risk sharing provided by capital
and credit markets. The discussion in Section 2 suggests that such regressions actually
reﬂect the combined smoothing eﬀects provided by ﬁnancial markets and labor markets,
i.e. commuting.
To motivate our subsequent analysis, we estimate regressions (2) and (3) for 48 US
federal states and 8 BEA regions, where the data for BEA regions is aggregated from the
state-level data. The moderate aim of this exercise is to examine whether risk sharing dif-
fers between states and BEA regions when commuting linkages between states are ignored,
see Hypothesis 1.
As discussed by Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) and Demyanyk, Ostergaard,
and Sørensen (2007), simple OLS estimations of equations (2) and (3) are likely to suﬀer
from problems of heteroscedasticity because small states typically have higher residual
variance than large states. We therefore follow their suggestion and estimate equations (2)
and (3) using a two-step Generalized Least Squares (GLS) procedure.9
The estimation results are reported in Table 2. We ﬁnd that states and regions do not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to the degree of income risk sharing they achieve. About
100% − 53% = 47 percent of output risk is laid oﬀ at the income smoothing level. This
magnitude for income risk sharing is similar to what has been reported in previous studies
for the US, see e.g. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007).
There is, however, a pronounced diﬀerence in the total amount of consumption risk
sharing that is achieved. For states, we ﬁnd that only 22.08 percent of output risk remains
unsmoothed after all levels of smoothing. For BEA regions, the point estimate is with βU =
42.93 about twice that large. Thus states tend to achieve a higher degree of consumption
risk sharing than BEA regions.
A candidate explanation for this diﬀerence is that the analysis at the federal-state level
does not take into account all relevant risk factors a state is exposed to. If states are
integrated by commuter ﬂows, state-level consumption varies not only with state-speciﬁc
shocks to output, but also with output changes in adjacent states, see Hypothesis 3. Since
the analysis at the state-level does not take the business cycle in the neighborhood into
account, regression (3) tends to over-estimate the eﬀective degree to which state-speciﬁc
consumption is separated from output risk. The regression only measures by how much
consumption depends on state-speciﬁc output shocks. In the presence of commuting,
however, also output ﬂuctuations in the neighborhood are a driving force for state-level
9The ﬁrst step is a panel Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. From the residuals we estimate
the variance of the error terms in the regression assuming that it varies by state. In the second step the
variables for each state are weighted by the estimated standard error for the state.
10Table 2: Income and consumption risk sharing among 48 federal states and 8 BEA regions
48 Federal States 8 BEA Regions
1970-1986 Coeﬀ.S t d . e r r . C o e ﬀ.S t d . e r r .
Income risk sharing (βK) 52.88 (1.11)∗∗ 55.86 (2.28)∗∗
Consumption risk sharing (βU) 22.08 (3.07)∗∗ 42.93 (5.16)∗∗
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions:
∆˜ yk
t =µk









t is the growth rate of output per capita in state k in period t, and ∆˜ xk
t is ∆xk
t minus
the US-wide output growth rate. ∆˜ yk
t and ∆˜ ck
t are deﬁned similarly using state-level
income and consumption. Fixed-eﬀects are denoted by µk
K and µk
U. The method of
estimation is a two-step Generalized Least Squares (GLS) procedure. The ﬁrst step is a
panel Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. From the residuals of this regression the
variance of the error terms is estimated assuming that it varies by state. In the second
step the variables for each state are weighted by the estimated standard error for that
state. Alaska, District of Columbia, and Hawai are excluded. Coeﬃcients and standard
errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. The number of observations is 1392 for the
state-level analysis and 232 for the BEA-level analysis. ∗∗,∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
11consumption.
If we use regressions like (2) and (3) to measure risk sharing among BEA regions, by
contrast, we measure risk sharing among regional entities that are quite independent in
terms of labor mobility. Or to put it diﬀerently, aggregate data for BEA regions already
comprises the relevant neighborhood. Consequently, the observed diﬀerences between
states and regions may stem from the fact that there is not much commuting between
BEA regions, while commuting between states is important.10
The diﬀerences between states and BEA regions are more pronounced for consumption
than for income risk sharing, see Table 2. This empirical observation can be rationalized by
the fact that income data, by construction, only comprises realized components of income,
while consumption data additionally reﬂects those returns to assets that are dominated
by yet-to-be-realized gains, see Sørensen et al. (2007, p. 589) for a related argument.
The option to commute is such an asset. To illustrate this with an example, we can
assume that the neighborhood experiences a boom. Then the option to commute to the
n e i g h b o r h o o di n c r e a s e si nv a l u ea n dw o r k e r sc a nb o r r o wi nt h es h o r tt e r mi na n t i c i p a t i o n
of higher labor incomes. Higher incomes can actually be realized by taking the option
to commute. Thus forward-looking agents may adjust their consumption even before the
boom in the neighborhood manifests itself in higher (realized) incomes.
5 Incorporating the neighborhood
We now test Hypothesis 3, which states that state-speciﬁc consumption growth varies with
the business cycle in the neighborhood. Thereafter, we examine this spatial comovement
in terms of commuting linkages between states.
The evidence presented in the last section has revealed that the eﬀects we are after
should show up more strongly in the consumption than in the income risk sharing channel.
For this reason, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of consumption risk sharing in the
following. The augmented consumption risk sharing regression we estimate reads as
∆˜ ck
t = µk
U + βU∆˜ xk
t + γU∆˜ zk
t + εk
U,t. (4)
The diﬀerence to our previous regression (3) is that idiosyncratic consumption growth is
10A similar interpretation has been oﬀered by Borge and Matsen (2004). They estimate a set of risk
sharing regressions for 19 Norwegian counties and 5 regions, respectively. At the county level, they ﬁnd a
very high estimate for income risk sharing in the order of 80 percent. In their long-run regressions, this
coeﬃcient is much lower at the level of regions. These results lead them to conjecture that commuting may
be an important part of the high estimate for income risk sharing at lower levels of regional aggregation.
Ad i ﬀerent but related explanation is provided by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003). They show
that better insurance of production risk entails higher specialization in production. Since large regions are
less specialized, the amount of risk sharing and t h es i z eo fr e g i o n sm a yb ei n v e r s e l yr e l a t e d .
12Table 3: Consumption risk sharing and spatial comovement
Consumption risk sharing, 1970-1998, 48 US federal states
Baseline Spatial Comovement
Coeﬀ.S t d . e r r . C o e ﬀ. Std. err.
∆˜ xk
t (state-speciﬁc shock) 22.08 (3.07)∗∗ 13.21 (3.79)∗∗
∆˜ zk
t (neighbor-speciﬁc shock) – – 19.48 (5.04)∗∗
Notes: Results are from the following GLS regression:
∆˜ ck
t = µk
U + βU∆˜ xk
t + γU∆˜ zk
t + εk
U,t.
The table displays the coeﬃcients βU and γU. ∆xk
t is the growth rate of output per
capita in state k in period t, and ∆˜ xk
t is ∆xk
t minus the US-wide output growth rate.
∆˜ ck
t is deﬁned similarly using state-level consumption. ∆˜ zk
t denotes the average
idiosyncratic output shock that hits adjacent states to state k at time t. µk
U denotes state
ﬁxed eﬀects. Estimation is carried out using GLS. Alaska, District of Columbia, and
Hawai are excluded. For further details see the notes to Table 2 and the main text.
Coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. Number of
observations is 1392. ∗∗,∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
allowed to vary with two rather than one kind of output risk. Besides state-speciﬁc output
shocks, ∆˜ xk
t, also output shocks that hit the neighborhood, ∆˜ zk
t , are accounted for. The
γU-coeﬃcient measures how strongly state-speciﬁc consumption growth is inﬂuenced by
output shocks that hit the neighborhood.11
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results obtained using GLS. The column labeled
"Baseline" displays the results for a benchmark speciﬁcation, in which the spatial co-
11In an alternative speciﬁcation, we build on Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007) in controlling
for the eﬀects of US banking deregulation on risk sharing. During the 1980s, states relaxed restrictions
on intrastate and interstate banking, i.e. statewide branching by mergers and aquisitions and entry by
out-of-state bank holding companies was permitted. From Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007)
we know that these structural changes in the banking industry had a considerable eﬀect on the level of
interstate income risk sharing. To control for this eﬀect, we followed Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen
(2007) and interacted the risk sharing coeﬃcients using a dummy variable that becomes one from the year
in which both interstate and intrastate deregulation took place. It turned out that these interaction terms
have almost no inﬂuence on the estimate for γU, which is the coeﬃcient we are primarily interested in.
13movement is omitted, γU =0 . Only 22.08 percent of state-speciﬁc output risk remains
unsmoothed. This magnitude for βU is similar to estimates reported in previous studies
which examine consumption risk sharing among all 51 federal states. For instance, As-
drubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) ﬁnd that about 25 percent of shocks to GSP remain
unsmoothed after all levels of smoothing during the period 1963-1990.
From the column labeled "Spatial Comovement" it can be seen that consumption is
highly dependent on the business cycle in the neighborhood. A substantial amount of 19.48
percent of business cycle ﬂuctuations in the neighborhood is transmitted to state-speciﬁc
consumption. At the same time, accounting for ∆˜ zk
t has reduced the point estimate for βU
substantially (from 22.08 to 13.21). Apparently, the additional risk factor has reclassiﬁed
an important part of the variance of consumption growth from state-speciﬁct on e i g h b o r -
speciﬁc output ﬂuctuations.
These results help us to understand why we observed diﬀerent amounts of consumption
risk sharing at the state- and BEA-level, see Table 2. In equation (3), the neighborhood
is excluded from the analysis, while the augmented regression (4) has revealed that the
business cycle in the neighborhood is in fact an important risk factor. We now corroborate
our economic interpretation that commuter ﬂows are an explanation for the observed
dependency on the neighborhood.
6 Accounting for commuter ﬂows
Our general strategy to corroborate our economic interpretation is to allow for hetero-
g e n e i t yi nt h er i s ks h a r i n gc o e ﬃcients by interacting them with data on commuter ﬂows.
Though we face the problem that there is no consecutive time-series data on commuter
ﬂows between US states. The fact that we only have cross-sectional data for 1970, 1980,
1990, and 2000 limits the scope of our analysis. While this data allows us to control for
cross-sectional variation in commuting patterns, we can only imperfectly account for varia-
tion in commuting patterns over time. Keeping this limitation in mind, we ﬁrst consider a
speciﬁcation that highlights cross-sectional variation in commuter rates. Thereafter, we at-
tempt to exploit the limited information on time variation by using use spline interpolation
techniques to generate a consecutive time-series on commuter rates.
In- and out-commuting have diﬀerent eﬀects on the pattern of regional risk sharing. The
spatial comovement that we have documented in the last section is expected to be driven
by workers who commute out of a state, see Hypothesis 3. By contrast, the degree to which
commuting drives a wedge between state-speciﬁc consumption and state-speciﬁc output
growth should increase with the extent of in-commuting, see Hypothesis 2. Consequently,
we interact the spatial regressor, ∆˜ zk
t , with the average out-commuter rate, OUT
k, and use
the average in-commuter rate, IN
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Although all variables are already formulated relative to their US-wide counterparts,
we additionally include time eﬀects, νU,t, since they may have an inﬂuence if interaction
terms are included in the regressions. In an alternative speciﬁcation, we replace time-
averaged commuter rates, IN
k and OUT
k, by spline interpolated commuter rates, INk
t
and OUTk
t .12 While the former speciﬁcation is more robust given the data limitations,
the pure cross-sectional variation in commuting patterns may correlate with many other
factors which we do not intend to measure. Using spline-interpolated commuter rates is
an attempt to test whether there is (still) evidence for a fundamental relation between risk
sharing and commuting once commuter rates are allowed to change over time.
T h ee s t i m a t i o nr e s u l t sa r es u m m a r i z e di nT a b l e4 .O u rm a i ni n t e r e s ti si nt h ei n t e r a c -
tion terms with commuter rates, IN
k · ∆˜ xk
t and OUT
k · ∆˜ xk
t.Aﬁrst important result is
that both interaction terms have the expected sign. There is a negative interaction between
the degree of pass-through of state-speciﬁc output shocks to consumption growth and the
in-commuter rate, i.e. β1
U is negative. This implies that states, which are more integrated
by commuting linkages, are more successful in decoupling their consumption from state-
speciﬁc output ﬂuctuations as conjectured by Hypothesis 2. While the negative coeﬃcient
for the interaction term is statistically signiﬁcant in the more robust speciﬁcation using
time-averaged commuter rates, the eﬀect is measured imprecisely if spline-interpolated
commuter rates are used. To illustrate the quantitative eﬀects implied by the coeﬃcient
for IN
k · ∆˜ xk
t, we consider a one standard-deviation increase in the average in-commuter
rate. Such change decreases the correlation between state-speciﬁc consumption and output
growth by 7.40 percentage points.
There is strong and robust evidence for Hypothesis 3, which states that the comovement
between output shocks that hit the neighborhood and state-speciﬁc consumption growth
depends on the number of workers who commute out of a state. In both speciﬁcations,
the interaction term with the out-commuter rate is positive and highly signiﬁcant. At the
same time, the implied quantitative eﬀect is sizeable. A one standard-deviation increase
in the average out-commuter rate increases the spatial comovement by 18.12 percentage
points. Further evidence for our hypotheses is provided by the coeﬃcient for non-interacted
output risk in the neighborhood, γ0
U. This coeﬃcient measures the magnitude of the spatial
comovement when the out-commuter rate is zero. It is insigniﬁcant in both speciﬁcations,





t in non-interacted form as control variables in this alternative speciﬁcation.
15Table 4: Consumption risk sharing and commuting
Consumption risk sharing, 1970-1998, 48 US federal states
Time-averaged Interpolated

























Notes: 1 Results displayed in column one are from the GLS regression
∆˜ ck
t = µk
U + νU,t + β0





















k are time-averaged in- and out-commuter rates, respectively.
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t + ζ2 · OUTk
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+β0























U, respectively; all other coeﬃcients
are suppressed. ∆˜ ck
t is the idiosyncratic growth rate of consumption, ∆˜ xk
t is the
idiosyncratic output growth rate in state k, and ∆˜ zk
t is the idiosyncratic output growth
rate in the neighborhood to state k. µk
U and νU,t are state and time ﬁxed-eﬀects,
respectively. Estimation is carried out using GLS. For further details see the notes to
Tables 2 and 3 and the main text. Coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are
multiplied by 100. The number of observations is 1392. ∗∗,∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
.
16which indicates that controlling for heterogeneity in commuting patterns can almost fully
explain the spatial comovement that we have documented in the last section.13
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has re-examined US interstate risk sharing. Interstate risk sharing has been
measured by the extent to which state-level consumption growth is separated from output
shocks. We have pointed to commuting as an alternative smoothing mechanism to missing
ﬁnancial insurance opportunities covering human capital. Speciﬁcally, we have tested three
empirical hypotheses concerning the relation between risk sharing and commuting.
A ﬁrst hypothesis was that commuting can explain why the amount of regional risk
sharing depends on the deﬁnition of regions. In the presence of commuting, the business
cycle risk of the neighborhood becomes a driving force for region-speciﬁc consumption.
For comparatively small regions, commuting is important and the neighborhood is thus an
important risk factor. For large regions, by contrast, commuting is of lesser importance and
the data already reﬂects the eﬀect that commuting has on risk sharing. We have provided
evidence on these relations by demonstrating that the 48 US federal states achieve better
consumption risk sharing than the 8 BEA regions.
Starting from this empirical observation, we have incorporated the neighborhood in the
analysis at the federal-state level. This extension allowed us to provide more direct evidence
for our hypothesis that state-speciﬁc consumption comoves with output ﬂuctuations in
adjacent states. We found the spatial comovement to be highly signiﬁcant and important
in economic terms.
In a ﬁnal step of the analysis we introduced explicit data on commuting linkages be-
tween states in order to test whether the aforementioned spatial comovement does indeed
correlate with commuter ﬂows. We found that controlling for cross-sectional heterogeneity
in commuting patterns can almost fully explain the spatial comovement between consump-
tion and output in the neighborhood.
From a more general perspective, our paper has illustrated that regional risk sharing
is not only a phenomenon attributable to ﬁnancial markets, but that labor markets also
play an important role for risk sharing and consumption smoothing.
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